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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E. J. HUBER and RALPH DuNKLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
VICTOR NEWMAN' 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 69166 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
The plaintiffs and respondents in their Amended 
Complaint alleged that on or about the fore part of April, 
1942, the plaintiffs and defendant entered into an oral 
agreement in which they agreed to enter into the con-
tracting business and make bids and accept certain jobs 
in the intermountain area. That pursuant to this agree-
ment the plaintiffs and defendant accepted certain jobs 
in the intermountain area and completed the same, the 
agreement further providing that the profits, if any, to 
'be derived from any work to be divided one-third each. 
That if anybody furnished machinery or trucks that they 
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were to receive rental therefor, the same as any third 
party. Piilfrtti:tf.s :fhrth~t ahegell that th~t cari.·i~d. on 
said business uhtl~r this afrarig~me:ht on various jobs, 
and that the defendant had refused to account on certain 
of these jobs, namely, the Railroad Job, the Hospital 
Jo:b and the Harrison-Dorman Job~ That the pUiintiffs , 
and respondents introduced evidence in support of their 
allegations in the said Amended Complaint. Evidence 
was Hitrodtwed that these parties entered into an agree-
ment which they termed a partnership, and which the 
court found to be a joint adventure. That although the 
~efendant and appellant, u:rider oath, aenie.a these al-
legations, alleging that the relationship on these par-
ticular projects was that of employee-employer, never-
theles·s, through his counsel, admitted that the relation-
ship was that of a joint adventure. (Tr. 250-251) The 
court after determining that a joint adventure existed, 
then proceeded to ail a:C(ilili:fi.ting between the parties. 
It appointed as a referee Mr. Wallace Dansie, who made 
hi~ rep<>rt t~ the court Th~ cburt aprrroved pr~rcHcally 
all of th~ report. Th~ plaintiffs afid reS·pbhd~rtts t~on­
bmded that certain portions r;f the report were in error, 
and put on evidence to sustain th~ir ~o:hfention that the 
referee should have report~d that more cubi~ yards of 
d~rt had been put in th~ jdb known tts the Ht)s{>ital Jon 
tlian that as submitted in his repbrt; Eihibit "E''. Th~ 
court adopted the r-eport with the inodi:fieatibn of the 
e"\ridence sublnitted in re·spect to the alhotin t of ~uibin 
yards of dirt as put into the job known a:s tne ''Ht;~Spital 
Job.'' The cohrt then rend~ fed judgrnent in fitvor ot 
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3 
the plaintiffs and respondents and against the defendant 
and appellant in the sum of $19,451.03 as the a1nount due 
and owing from the defendant and appellant to these 
plaintiffs and respondents. The ·court ·before entering 
judgment had the referee, Mr. Dansie, testify in respect 
to the report. The defendant and appellant made no 
objections to the filing of the findings of the referee, 
nor did he file or make objections to the same. He also 
had ample opportunity to question Mr. Dansie on the 
findings. 
ARGUMENT 
These Respondents will answer the Assignments of 
Error as referred to in Defendant '·s and Appellant's 
Brief in the order in which they appear. The Defend-
ant's and Appellant's First Assignment of Error is as 
follows: 
''The District Court had no jurisdiction to pro-
ceed to an accounting of the affairs of an alleged 
partnership until it has first judicially determined 
the existence of such partnership upon adequate 
evidence within the issues, and until after it has 
entered an appealable decree that defendant 
account.'' 
In support of this assignment, the defendant and appel-
lant relies upon the Utah ease of Rozelle v. Third Judi-
cial District Court, 39 P. (2d) 1113. We refer this court 
to the Utah case of Gibbs v. District Court of .the Third 
Judicial District, 44 P. (2d) 504. The plaintiff in the 
Gilb'bs case soug~t to set aside assignments of certain 
mortgages and other documents connected therewith, 
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and have an accounting of all moneys received by the de-
fendant by reason of such assignments. The District 
Court decided the issue in favor of the plaintiff, that the 
assignment should he set aside. The court then directed 
an accounting without making any Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, or Decree. The defendant con-
tended that the trial court was without jurisdiction to 
proceed with the accounting until it had made Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and had made and en-
tered its Decree adjudging plaintiff in the lower court 
entitled to the property; further, defendant contended 
that he was entitled to have that issue fully determined 
by the trial court on appeal before he could be required 
to su1bmit his books to inspection in an accounting pro-
cedure. The facts in this case are in ·substance identical 
with that before us. T.his court in the Gi·bbs case held 
that when a court of equity assumed jurisdiction to de-
termine whether assignment contracts should be set 
aside, ordinarily has jurisdiction to settle the con-
troversy, and if it finds contracts void, it then had the 
right to require an accounting of moneys received by 
the defendant during the time the property was in his 
possession, and had the further power to enter judgment 
for any amount found to be collected for which the plain-
tiff below was entitled. This court further held that in 
a suit to set aside a·ssignment contracts and to recover 
property assigned and moneys collected thereon, court 
had jurisdiction to direct accounting, without first mak-
ing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and enter-
ing Decree adjudging plaintiff entitled to property in 
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suit. The court resolved the question involved as fol-
lows: 
"In a suit of this kind, is it the duty which the 
court expressly enjoins on a trial court to first 
enter judgment as to all matters iin bar of the 
accounting- before he can proceed to finish the case 
by directing an accounting and adjudicating the 
amount shown to he due in such an accounting~" 
The court answers that question by saying that such 
procedure is not required by any statute or by any de-
cisions of this court. The court further differentiates 
the Rozzelle case, and expressly holds that the Rozzelle 
case does not have a contrary finding to that of the Gibbs 
case. 
The rule as expressed 1by this court is the rule of 
other jurisdictions. See : 
Schesfski v. Anker, 15 P. (2d) 746; 
Fox v. Hall, 128 P. 749; 
Hallahan v. Sowers, 11 A. 263; 
Smith v. Smith, 101 N. Y. S. 521. 
RESPONDENTS' SECOND AssiGNMENT oF ERROR 
Defendant and appellant contends that there is no 
finding responsive to paragra·phs one and two, alleging 
partnership, and paragraphs three and four, alleging 
breaches of duty in the Amended Complaint. The plain-
tiffs and respondents in their Amended Complaint al-
leged that the 'Plaintiffs and defendant entered into an 
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oral agreement in which they agreed to enter into the 
contracting bus,ines·s and accept certain bids for certain 
work to ·be done in the intermountain area. Paragraph 
two of the Amended Complaint further ·set forth the 
fact that during the fore part of April, 1942, these plain-
tiffs and the defendant carried on and continued to 
carry on said business, and set forth the jobs which were 
uncompleted. It further set forth the fact that the jobs 
enumerated were undertaken lby the plaintiffs and de-
fendant jointly. The court in its Findings of Fact, para-
graph one, recited in substance, that which was alleged 
by the plaintiffs in paragraphs one and two of their 
Amended Complaint. It certainly is responsive. 
Paragraph three of the Amended Complaint recites 
as follows: 
''That these plaintiffs have at all times and in all 
things duly conformed to their understandings 
and done their part in all respects in accorandce 
~th said understandings." 
The findings as set forth in paragraph three of the Find-
ings of Fact provide as follows: 
''That these plaintiffs have at all time·s and in all 
things duly conformed to their understandings 
and done their part in all respects in accordance 
with said understandings.'' 
How could a finding be more responsive to an allegation? 
Finding number four specifically sets ferth that the 
said defendant, Victor N ewm.an, refused to account for 
moneys received and expended in respect to the jobs set 
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forth. The emuplaint alleged that the defendant refused 
to account for 1noneys received. Paragraph four of the 
findings further sets forth that there was no definite 
term agreed upon between the parties of the said joint 
adventure. The finding is responsive to the allegations 
in paragraph four of the complaint. 
The appellant further contends that there is no find-
ing responsive to the negative issues contained in the 
first defense of the .appellant. The first defense of the 
appellant as set forth in its Amended Answer and Coun-
terclaim is that the Amended Complaint does not state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This ques-
tion was raised on Demurrer, and the court overruled 
the Demurrer of the defendant and the matter was dis-
posed of. The fact that the eourt finds the material al-
legations of the complaint in favor of the plaintiffs and 
awards a judgment thereon is the same as stating that 
there is a cause of action ~in favor of the plaintiffs and 
against this defendant. It certainly is not necessary for 
. the court in its findings to set forth the fact that the 
Amended Complaint does state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a cause of action. The finding in favor of the 
plaintiffs is ·sufficient. 
The appellant further contends that there is no 
finding responsive to paragraphs one, two, three and 
four of the appellant's third defense and counterclaim. 
The appellant in said paragraphs does nothing more 
than allege that the relationship between the respondents 
and appellant in the transactions as set forth, both in 
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the Amended Complaint and Amended Answer and Coun-
terclainl, was that of employer-employee and not one of 
a joint adventure or partnership. Further, he alleges 
in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim that the acts 
of these respondents on said transactions were in breach 
of the contractual relationship, that is, that of master 
and servant (employer-employee) ; that the actions of 
the respondents were contrary to their agreement. The 
court in its findings sets forth the fact that the relation-
ship on the transactions involved was that of a joint 
adventure, thereby negativing the contention of the ap-
pellant that the relationship was that of ma·ster and serv-
ant. It is not necessary for the court in making the find .. 
ing that the relationship on the transactions involved 
was that of a joint adventure to set forth in negative 
terms that the relationship was not that of master and 
servant. By its .statement that it was a joint adventure 
it without question disposes of the issue that the rela-
tionship w~s that of master and servant. In other words, 
if the court found that the relationship was that of mas-
ter and servant, it would not be necessary to say it was 
not that of a joint adventure. Therefore, the finding 
of the court that the relationship was that of a joint ad-
venture is responsive and disposes of the contention of 
the appellant in said paragraphs. 
Paragraphs five, six, seven and eight of the Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim grow out of the contractual 
relationship of the appellant's allegations of the rela-
tionship of master and servant. If there was no such 
relationship, then, of course, the contention of the a.p-
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pellant as set forth in paragraphs five, six, seven and 
eight fall of their own weight, and there is no necessity 
of the finding of the court negativing the allegations 
thereof. The san1e argument goes to paragraphs nine, 
ten and e!even of appellant's Amended ·Complaint and 
Counterclaim. 
In respect to the fourth defense and counterclaim, 
the appellant again set~ forth the same contentions as 
it has in its Amended Complaint, that of the relation-
ship of master and servant. Its fourth defense is merely 
as to a particular job, that is, the Fort Douglas J.ob. The 
fact that the court found that the relationship was that 
of a joint adventure disposes of the issue that there was 
the relationship of master and servant and, therefore, 
the breach of the relationship of master and servant, of 
course, falls of its own weight. There can be no breach 
of duty of the master and servant relationship, as the 
court found that none existed. 
The Conclusions of Law are responsive to the Find-
ings of Fact as made and entered by the court. The 
findings of the court, that the acts of the parties in re-
s·pect to the transactions involved were that of a joint 
adventure in and of itself, negatives the relationship of 
master and servant. Therefore, any acts complained of 
by the appellant, growing out of the relationship of mas-
ter and servant, and which is contrary to the finding of the 
court of that of joint adventure, falls of its own weight. 
The appellant in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
admits that the relationship alleged by him pertains to 
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the same transactions as alleged by the plaintiffs and 
respondents in their Amended Complaint in which it is 
alleged that that relationship was one of a joint ad-
venture. The fact that the court finds that the relation-
·ship alleged hy the plaintiffs was one of joint adventure, 
whereas the plaintiffs and respondents in their Amended 
Complaint refer to the word ''partnership", does not 
in any way change the situation between the parties. 
In the case of Wells v. B. E. Porter Estate, 27·2 P. 
1041, the following statement is made by the court: 
''Appellant cla;ims that the findings do not cover 
all the issues made by the pleadings, and partic-
ularly those arising under its affirmative defense. 
The court found expressly upon all the issues 
made by the amended complaint and the denials 
of the answer. These findings are inconsistent 
with the allegations of appellant '.s affirmative de-
fense. They therefore were sufficient, and it was 
unnecessary to make particular findings as to the 
issues made by the affirmative allegations of the 
answer.'' 
In the cas.e of Kendrick v. Gould, 197 P. 681, it was 
stated: 
''Although a ·special defense may be set up in the 
answer, if there is not evidence to support it the 
appellate court must conclude that any finding 
whieh could have been made would have been 
adverse to defendant on that issue, to that, under 
such circumstances, the failure to find thereon 
does not require a reversal.'' 
We feel that the case of Phillips v. Stark, 223 P. 443, 
is ·squarely in 'point. T.hat case was an action on a con-
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tract, in which the defendant denied the allegations of 
the complaint and set up a contract different from that 
alleged by plaintiff and pleaded the rescission thereof; 
court's failure to find on issue of rescission held not 
error, in view of findings that the parties entered into 
the contract pleaded by plaintiff, and that defendant 
had violated such contract, ·since the court, in making 
such findings, found by implication that the contract 
alleged in the answer waa not made, and the question 
of whether such contract was rescinded therefore became 
immaterial. 
In the case before us, the plaintiffs and respondents 
plead a certain contract of joint adventure and the de-
fendant and appellant denied the same, alleging a master 
and servant relationship. The court by finding in favor 
of the plaintiffs and respondents of a relationship of a 
joint adventure iby implication negatives any relation-
ship of that of master and servant and, therefore, a 
specific finding upon any issue with respect to damages 
suffered as a result of a relationship which the court by 
implication negatives, is immaterial. Therefore, a find-
ing on such points is not necessary. 
As we interpret the contention of the appellant, it 
is to the effect that the court should find that there was 
no relationship of master and servant 'between the parties 
on the transactions involved, and we assume negative 
the various other allegations arising out of the con-
tractual relationship as alleged of master and servant. 
This, of course, is not necessary in view of the fact that 
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the court found the opposite to he true; that is, that of 
joint adventure. It would only he superfluous and cer-
tainly unnecessary to set forth that there was no master 
and servant relationship. The court did that, and when 
it found there was a joint adventure, thereby refused to 
accept the contention of the appellant and in substance 
negativing the same. 
REsPONDENTs' THIRD AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
''A party who, without being intere~ted in prop-
erty, is by agreement to receive as compensation 
for his services, and only as compensation, a cer-
tain proportion of the profits, and is neither held 
out to the world as a partner nor, through the 
negligence of the owner permitted to hold him-
self out to the world as a partner, is not a partner 
either as to the owner of third persons. The 
.court failed to give effect to this principle by an 
appropriate finding of fact upon evidence re-
sponsive to the issues but in its remarks and rul-
ings from the bench disregarded the same.'' 
It is the further contention of the appellant that the 
court erred in failing to give effect to the principle that 
a party who, without being an interested party, is by 
agreement to receive as compensation for his services, 
and only as compensation, a share in proportion of the 
profit,s, and is neither held out to the world as a partner 
nor, through the negligence of the owner, permitted to 
hold himself out to the world as a partner, is not a 
partner either as to the owner or third persons. 
In the first place, the court did not find that there 
was a partnership relationship, 1but found that in respect 
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to the transactions involved that there is a relationship 
of that of joint adventure. In other words, !it is the 
contention of the appellant, as we interpret it from this 
Assig111nent of Errors, that the evidence is such that the 
court should have found that there was no partnership 
agreement, and also, no doubt, a joint adventure. With-
out referring· to the testimony of Mr. Dunkley, one of 
the respondents and plaintiffs herein, the fact that there 
was a joint adventure on the transactions involved was 
admitted and proved by the appellant and defendant 
himself. The court interrogated Mr. Newman. (Tr. 147, 
148, 149 and 150) In answer to the interrogations of the 
court, :Mr. Newman made the express statements that he 
agreed to share profits with Mr. Dunkley and Mr. Huber 
on the Hill Field Jab, The :McKee Job, The Poulson 
Job, the Supply Depot Job, the Fort Douglas Job, and 
the Harrison-Dorman Job. Mr. Newman further stated 
that on these jobs the profits were to be split one-third 
to Mr. Dunkley, one-third to Mr. Huber, and one-third 
to himself. The profits to be split, however, after taking 
out the rental for the equipment used; that Huber and 
Dunkley would do the supervising. 
At page 116 of the Transcript, a significant state-
ment is made by Mr. Newman ~in respect to the Hospital 
Job, as follows : 
Q. Now, when you found out you were going to 
make money on the hospital job, that is when you ceased 
to want these 'boys as partners, isn't it~ 
A. That is right. 
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As a matter of fact, the joint adventure of the par-
ties was admitted by defendant's counsel, Mr. Morris·sey. 
(Tr. 250-251) 
THE CounT: I think the re·cord-perhaps :Mr. 
Callister got this into the record, ·but to make 
sure, the court would like to say that it is ad-
mitted by all parties that Mr. Newman and Mr. 
Dunkley at least, were agreed that the joint ven-
ture would terminate on September 3rd. 
MR. CALLISTER: I think that is right, your honor, 
and we will so ·stipulate. 
MR. MoRRISSEY : Y:es. 
THE CouR'i': With that then in the record, I will 
sustain the obje-ction. 
It was the contention of the ·plaintiffs that Mr. Huber 
was a party of the joint adventure after September 3, 
1943. However, the court found that there was only a 
joint adventure as to September 3, 1943, as stipulated 
by ·counsel as set forth above. I do not and cannot under-
stand how the appellant and defendant can now come 
before this court and contend there was no partnership 
or joint adventure when it expressly so stipulated in 
open court. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the plaintiffs 
and respondents and appellant and defendant entered 
into a contractual relationship on certain jobs, the terms 
of which were as alleged in the plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint. That is, that the three parties involved were to 
take jobs from time to time; that any machinery and 
equipment which was furnished was to receive a rental 
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price the1·efor; and the profits, if any, or losses, were 
to be divided equally among the three parties. Pursuant 
to this arrangement which was entered into in the month 
of April, 1942, many jobs were entered into. (Tr. 3 to 10, 
inclusive.) On the Hospital Job, as the same is termed, 
as well as the Harrison-Dorman job, the plaintiffs and 
respondents had an insurance policy with the 8tate In-
surance Fund for compensation insurance on the em-
ployees that were employed on these two johs. (Tr. 10, 
11, 12, and 13) That premiums were paid in accordance 
with the rules and regulations of the State Institance 
Fund by these plaintiffs. This policy is known as Ex-
hibit "A" in the transcript. (Tr. 14) The evidence is 
conclusive that funds were put into an account by all 
these parties, that is, the plaintiffs and defendant, which 
moneys were paid to employees on the Hospital Job. (Tr. 
16) 
Ne-wman, after persistent efforts by the court to 
elicit the facts from him, admitted that the 'plaintiffs and 
respondents worked on the Hospital Job the same as they 
had on the other jobs enumerated in the complaint for 
approximately two and one-half to three weeks. (Tr.154) 
Newman, who had changed his testimony from time to 
time particularly from that which he had sworn to under 
oath, in his amended answer, tried to have the court be-
lieve that he hired Mr. Huber and Mr. Dunkley on the 
Hospital Job. (Tr. 163) That he hired Mr. Huber as 
his foreman, notwithstanding the fact he claimed they 
were incompetent. Employees do not advance their own 
money to pay for employees of their employer, not do 
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they carry compensation and do the things that were 
done 'in this case. The most significant statement that 
Newman ·could have made was to the effect that after 
he found out he was going to make money on the Hos-
pital Job he did not want them as partners any more. 
On those j01bs on which money was supposed to be lost 
they were his partners, but when any money was to be 
made, then they ceased to be his partners or to be in 
the joint enterprise with him. We refer this court to 
Transcript 182 in which the court interrogated Newman 
further. At this juncture the court was on the verge of 
taking action against Newman for testifying diam-etrical-
ly opposite to the facts plead in his amended answer 
under oath. 
FouRTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
"The court erred in its ·conclusions from the bench 
that these were joint ventures on all these jobs 
mentioned in the ·complaint, that is the railroad 
job, the hospital job and the Harrison-Dorman 
joh; the hospital joh up to 1Sept. 3rd, ·because 
there were no written findings of fact upon evi-
dence within the issues made or filed by the court 
with conclusions of law, and decree to account, 
made, filed or entered either before or after said 
conclusions from the 'bench. And the court erred 
in proceedings to the appointment of a referee 
in the absence of said jurisdictional pre-re-
quisites.'' 
The defendant and appellant is raising the same ques-
tion as was raised in his .First and Third Assignments of 
Error. We refer this cour1 to the Gibbs case heretofore 
cited; also statements made by defendant and appellant's 
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counsel adn1itting· joint venture heretofore quoted. This 
court had the rig-ht to order an accounting without first 
making- Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree deter1nining- that a joint adventure existed. The 
fact that the court in its opinion felt that a joint adven-
ture existed and so found in its order heretofore referred 
to was sufficient and it had a right to proceed to an ac-
counting. 
FIFTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
"The court further erred in its order of reference, 
in that, neither by such order of reference, nor 
by any decree to account, nor otherwise, did the 
court require the parties to plead in accounting 
by serving and filing of any statement of account, 
counter statement, objections or exceptions to 
specific items of account by either party upon 
the other, so as to produce an issue of fact for 
trial, limiting and defining the scope of the evi-
dence upon the trial of such issue on issues. A 
pleading, petition, affidavit or statement of claim 
or account of some kind or character is essential 
to confer jurisdiction upon a court to conduct a 
trial of a question of fact or law." 
In this Assignment of Error the defendant and a;p-
pellant again contends that the action of the court pro-
ceeding to an accounting was error in that there was no 
Findings of Fact, or Conclusions based upon evidence 
within the issues and the pleadings establishing partner-
·ship or other relationship or any breach of duty arising 
therefrom, and no decree ordering that either party 
aoooun t to the other. 
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The defel1dant and appellant in its Brief (Page 55) 
further st~tes that had Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree to ~ccount been previously ma<le it 
would have required that the party liable be decreed to 
account forthwith, file a statement of his. account with 
the opposing party, showing separately the debits and 
credits; that is, the receipts and disbursements. This 
is not the law in this jurisdiction and we again refer the 
court to the Gibbs case, (Supra). This court in that 
case stated with approval.the following: 
'' * * * In some jurisdictions the trial court may, 
whenever neces·sary, direct an accounting, either 
with or without the entry of an interlocutory 
judgment, and may take the proof itself or make 
a reference therefor. * * ill'" 
In view of the fact that this ·court has held that an inter-
locutory judgment and decree is not necessary before 
the court may take an accounting, it necessarily follows 
that pleadings or statements of account need not be 
formally fil~d. If the cou;rt may take the proof itself 
it ~ertai11ly has a right to reqitilire the .defendant and 
appellant to produce books and aeeounts. It may ask 
th~ asflist.an~e to pr~pare a.;ud corr~lat~ the a~ounts 
and ho.o~s :Of tl;le p;;trty fpr presentation to the .court, 
this b~ing ~one, of :eours~, to expedite tb.e matter. 
This oou.;rt stated with approval in the Gi'bhs ease, 
supra, th.e following : 
'' * * * 'rhe t;rial j;udge .~;t~nounced his views as t·o 
certain issues, hut not having 1Jlade findings or 
entered a decree, the whole matter is still before 
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him, and he n1ay reach a different conclusion when 
the case is finally submitted. The 1nanner in which 
he proceeds with the trial is discretionary and 
within jurisdiction. His discretion may not be 
controlled by this court. * * * '' 
Certainly the District Court did not err in its proceed-
ings when it did not make Findings, Conclusions or De-
cree, but proceeded to have the account taken. Certainly 
no pleading ~is essential or necessary other than that 
originally filed in view of the statements by this court 
in th~ Gibbs case, supra. No Findings of Fact or Con-
clusiops of Law or Decree are essential or necessary 
before the court could proceed to an accounting. Ther~­
fore, it had a right to prcceed to an accounting based 
upon the original pleadings. As this court further said 
in the Gibbs case: 
"a court of equity, assuming jurisdiction to de-
termine whether assignment ·contracts should be 
set aside, ordinarily has jurisdiction to settle 
whole controversy, and if it finds contracts void, 
to require accounting of m.oneys received by de-
fendants during time property was in their pos-
session and to enter judgment for return of prop-
erty assigned, and for any amount found to hav~ 
been ·collected to which plaintiff is entitled." 
In the case of Probst v. Bearman, (01da.) 183 Pac. 
886, the plaintiff sued for the c~ncellation of an oil and 
gas lease. After determining the main issue in the case 
in favor of the plaintiff the Court proeeeded with the 
trial and requ[red the defendant to account for the oil 
and gas produced on the lease.d premises during the 
litigation, the Court holdjng that the accounting was 
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ancillary to the main cause of action. The Court held 
in this case that when the plaintiff succeeded in cancell-
ing the lease his right to the oil and gas produced on the 
premises during the litigation followed as a natural 
sequence, and in support of its holding cited 1 C. J. 
616 (1Supra). 
Defendant and appellant's whole basis for reversal 
as we see it is upon the theory that the court did not first 
make and enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree, and, therefore, could not order an account-
ing. The Gibhs case (!Supra) definitely disposes of that 
issue. 
SrxTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
''The court erred for the same rea·sons last speci-
fied in proceedings to a trial of unknown. issues, 
or no issues of fact defined by any pleading of 
the parties, and to hear evidence directed to no 
'specific issue of fact, and upon no written plead-
ings, and to make findings thereon, sounding in 
accounting. Thereby acting without jurisdic-
tion.'' 
The defendant's sixth assignment of error is in sub-
stance the same as that of the fifth, and~ therefore, tit is 
unnecessary for us to amplify our argument further in 
respect to the sixth assignment of error. 
SEVENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
"The court erred in its said proceedings in re-
ceiving or considering any evidence or testimony 
because it was proceeding without jurisdiction for 
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the reasons already stated, and es·pecially in re-
ceiving in evidence and in taking judicial notice of 
any of the contents of the document.'' 
The defendant and appellant again refers to the same 
~ntention that the court proceeded without jurisdiction 
for the reasons stated in its other assignments of error. 
That is, that the court could not proceed to an account-
ing until it had made its Findings of Fact, Conclustions 
of Law and Decree. 'V e have heretofore discussed this 
at length. It further states that the court erred in re-
ceiving evidence and taking judicial notice of plaintiff 
and respondents' Exhibit "E ", which was Wallace 
Dansie's report. This report was submitted without ob-
jection from the defendant and appellant. When the 
same was offered in evidence (Tr. 201) Mr. Morrissey, 
attorney for the defendant and appellant, stated that it 
c.ould he filed and thereby making no objection to the 
same being received by the court. We must remember 
that this is a case in which the defendant and appellant 
from the beginning insisted there was no joint adventure, 
but subsequently upon cross examination admitted the 
same. That in order to expedite the trial of this cause 
the court saw fit to refer this matter. 1\.t transcript 201 
Mr. Dansie stated that he asked them (referring to all 
the parties; that is, the defendant and the plaintiffs) for 
their books, and that there was submitted to him all the 
books and records of the enterprise, on the jobs in ques-
tion in this controversy. After Mr. Dansie bad gone 
over the books as submitted to him, he made his report 
of which he served copies upon the parties who had ample 
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opportunity to determine the correctne-ss ef the same. 
Notice was served upon the defendant and appellant 
(Tr. on Appeal 80) giving them notice that the same 
wou:ld be submitted to the court and notifying them that 
if' they had any obje·ctio:n:s to the same to present the 
same at that ti:tne. The defendant and appellant saw fit 
to· make no oJbjections to the same, and as he:retofdte 
stated, did not object to- the report heing filed. There 
was no evidence irttr.odnced that the eomputation·s a~ 
found by Mr. nansie were inoorrecf. T1:1e report of Mr. 
Dansie ref~rted to as plaintiff's Exhibit ''E" did nO't 
attempt to :tesoi\Te the issues df fact in favc:tr of any 
patty. The defendant a:t no time eontended at the ttial, 
not are we to find from his Brief that the figures lis 
f.oulid by Mr. :D.anste were incottect. That the· ·c6ttrt upon 
i'eceiVing n.o ohjeefi()Iis from the defendant, teceived the 
same. Phrlnti:rf.s' Exlrlbit "E", tlie repdrt of :Mr.Da:tisie, 
was subject to the cross•exam:ination: of the defend:attt 
as id its -co:i"tectnes:s. Certainly, to· expedite a matter 
f:Jf this kind the court has· a tight to reqttest assistanc~ 
from art accountEtnt, and where his report is admitted 
without objections, no error has been ·eommitted by the 
court. The ap·pointmertt of :Mt. Dansie was for the pitr-
P'Ose of having a bo·6kkeepet correlate and reduce to an 
ultimate figure the debits and credits of the parties from 
the baoks given to Mr. Dansie by the parties involved. 
That statement of debits a·nd cr~dits was filed withbtit 
o'bjection. At transcript 208 t:fle r~cord ~learly shows 
that ~tll tbe records were pt·~sent at the heatin~. Tbe 
attorney for the plaintiffs and respd:ndents requested that 
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all records be brought at the hearing. (Tr. 208) The 
records were there for the purpose of examination by all 
parties in the event they did not agree with the compila-
tion of the san1e by .Mr. Dansie. The court gave all par-
ties the opportunity to question l\ir. Dansie in respect 
to his report. The plaintiffs and respondents did not 
agree with the figures of Mr. Dansie in one respect and, 
therefore, introduced evidence by Mr. Dunkley, one of 
the plaintiffs herein (Tr. 223, 224, 225) showing the 
amount of loads and yardage on the hospital job. Mr. 
Dunkley's testimony in respect to the yardage on the Hos-
pital job is uncontradicted by any testimony whatsover 
and the court saw fit to accept the same, which was 
proper. 
EIGHTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
"The said referee report, plaintiffs' exhibit A, 
was void on its face, and on the face of the record 
for the reasons that: 
(a) The author thereof, Mr. Dansie never quali-
fied by taking the oath required by Utah Const. 
Art. VI, Sec. 10 and Utah Annot. Code, 1943, 104-
27-7, 
(b) The author thereof never proceeded in con-
formity to Utah Annot. Code, 1943, 104-27-6, to 
give notice to the parties, conduct a trial, hear 
sworn testimony, make findings of fact and con-
clu~ions of law, and to report the results thereof 
to the court, 
(c) The author thereof proceeded, on the contrary 
to interview various persons ex parte, out of the 
.presence of defendant and his counsel, to make 
private inquiries, and to receive and consider un-
sworn hearsay statements, oral and written, from 
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various unknown persons; and to receive and con-
sider the contents of sundry written books, rec-
ords and documents submitted to him by plaintiffs 
and by unknown persons without the oaths of 
attesHng witness or witnesses, and out of the 
presence of defendant and his counsel; and to 
compile a report based upon unsworn hearsay 
statements of persons, books or documents un-
known to the defendant, 
(d) By these and other steps and proceedin~s un-
known to and forbidden by law the author of the 
report purported to make and ·state an account 
wherein and whereby he resolved all questions and 
dou'bts in his mind against the defendant and in 
favor of the plaintiffs, and refused to consider 
statements of claim ·by third persons which, if 
allowable, were just claims in accounting in the 
nature of operating expenses which must first be 
deducted from gross income, 'before striking any 
·balance in accounting, 
(e) The author of said report was never lawfully 
appointed referee to take or state an account, be-
cause the court was without jurisdiction to make 
the order of appointment, in the absence of any 
prior findings of fact and decree to account; and 
also because there were no written pleadings or 
is·sues defining the issues and limiting proofs in 
accounting to specific items of debit or credit, 
charge or countercharge in account.~' 
These plaintiffs and respondents assert that the 
referee's report, plaintiffs' Exhibit "E'', was not void 
on its face for any reasons whatsoever. The defendant 
and appellant contends that the author thereof, Mr. 
Dansie, never qualified by taking the oath required by 
the laws of Utah. 'l,here is nothing in tl1e record what-
soever showing that Mr. Dansie did not take the oath or 
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that he did take the oath of office. The record shows that 
Mr. Dansie was sworn as a witness (Tr. 194) at the 
time he was put on the stand in respect to his report to 
identify the san1e and to submit to cross examination 
regarding· the same. The record is silent as to his being 
sworn in any other respect. vV e refer this court to 45 
Am. Jur. Page 556, Section 19, in which it is stated as 
follows: 
"\Vhere the record is silent on the question 
whether the referee was sworn, the presumption 
is that he took the oath as prescribed by law, slince 
all officers are presumed to do their duty.'' 
The question whether the referee was sworn or took 
his oath was never raised by defendant and appellant at 
the trial, and he had ample opportunity to do so if he 
desired. If the defendant and appellant had had an ob-
jection he ·should have made the same at the trial. An 
objection that the referee was not sworn is waived by 
appearing and going to trial. See 3 Am. Jur. Page 417, 
Section 872, Note 16. It is fundamental that the failure 
of an injured party to call the attentrion of the trial court 
to the alleged error at the time it occurs, or at least when 
it is still in the power ·Of the trial court to correct it, 
amounts ordinarily to a waiver of the error or creates an 
estoppel against bringing it to the attention of the trial 
court. See 3 Am. Jur. Page 417, 8ection 872. 
The defendant and appellant further contends that 
Mr. Dansie proceeded contrary to the laws of Utah writh 
respect to ·conducting a trial, hearing testimony, etc. 
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Further, that the referee did not make any findings. We 
are not so concerned with the form of findings as to the 
fact that findings were made and that they were of ben-
efit to the court, which it ·could adopt in whole or in part. 
Such findings as made ·by Mr. Dansie were very intelli-
gent, helpful and correct. They were such findings that 
the court saw fit to adopt with some Inod[fication. It 
is the general rule that the master's findings should be 
sustained unless they are manifestly, palpaJbly, or clear-
ly appears to have been error or mistake upon his part. 
8ee 3 Am. Jur. Page 48'2, Section 913, Note 3. Certainly 
there is no manifest or even a slight indication of error 
in the report of Mr. Dansie. The defendant and appellant 
was given every opportunity to question the referee on 
hls report, to examine the same, to make objections and 
fully 'Protect his interests in every way. The fact tbat 
he did not do so is ample evidence that he admitted th~ 
correctness of the same. If there was error at that tinw 
why was it not raised~ Why raise error, (which we 
strenuously contend does not nor did not exist) now that 
could have been raised in the event that such had been 
llllade at the proper time before the trial court f 
When evidence is not reported in the referee's find-
ings, the findings are nevertheless final and cannot be 
disturbed on appeal. ~See 3 Am. Jur. Page 42, Section 
913, Note 9 . 
.A referee should report the facts found and not the 
testimony. Excep-t where the testimony is excepted to, 
and then the ground of objection and the decision thereon 
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should be stated. He is not required to state every sub-
sidiary circumstance supporting his ultimate conclusion 
as to the facts, nor to summarize evidence not given 
credence by hin1, nor to narrate n1atters having no 
probative force in his final determination. See 45 Am . 
. Jur. Page 567, Section 36. 
As stated before, defendant and appellant saw fit 
to consent that the report be filed; saw fit to make no 
objections to its correctness; had opportunity to cross 
examine referee on all points. However, he did so on 
some portions of the same. It is fundamental that if a 
party desires to challenge the findings of the referee 
he should do so within the proper time and if he fails 
to do so and the report is confirmed, he is bound by the 
findings and cannot be heard to dispute their truthful-
ness or escape the legal consequences flowing therefrom. 
See 45 An1. Jur. Page 570, Section 39, Sections 14 and 
15. A report and obje·ctions filed thereto make an issue. 
If no objections are filed there· is no issue in respect to 
the findings. 
The referee was lawfully appointed, made his re-
port; the court saw fit to adopt in substance the whole 
thereof, making some changes after hearing evidence. 
We take the position that if there was error, which we 
em·phatically contend there was not, in respect to the 
appointment and proceedings of the referee, then de-
fendant and appellant had ample opportunity to make 
his objections ; he had ample opportunity to do so. He 
saw fit at the time of the trial not to make objections 
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and, therefore, he cannot now at this time make objec-
tions that he had ample opportunity to make at the trial 
of this cause. 
The plaintiffs and respondents did not agree with 
the numbers of yards as reported hy :Mr. Dansie and 
thereby put on evidence by Mr. Dunkley. {Tr. 233) Mr. 
Dunkley testified to the exact amount of yardage, which 
tHstimony the court accepted and received and thereby 
modified the referee's report in respect thereto. Mr. 
Newman was present in court with his books, had ample 
opportunity to cross examine Mr. Dunkley and to submit 
evidence contrary thereto if Mr. Dunkley was in error. 
This he did not do, the reasons being that the testimony 
of Mr. Dunk ely was correct in respect to the amount of 
yardage hauled at the Hospital J o·b. This evidence being 
uncontroverted, the court had the perfect right to accept 
the figure as being correct. Mr. Newman had ample op-
portunity to show that the 69c paid per cubic yard was 
incorrect and that the 59c figure should be us·ed. He 
had the contracts in ·court. It is uncontroverted that 69c 
was the contract price for the cubic yards of dirt to be 
hauled on the Hospital Job. The mere fact that the 
original contract was 5·9c, but later changed to 69c, does 
not deprive the plaintiffs and respondents as ·members 
of the joint adventure from re-ceiving the increase. Why 
should Mr. Newman benefit at the expense of his fellow 
members in the joint adventure~ 
The defendant and appellant further contends that 
the report did not take into consideration claims of third 
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parties in arriving at the balance due between the par-
ties; that said clain1s were allowable. This, of course, 
is ridiculous. The members of the joint adventure are 
liable for the obligations of the joint adventure. The 
fact that certain parties claim amounts due that have 
not b~en paid by any n1ember of the joint adventure in 
an accounting cannot be allowed in favor of one of the 
members of that joint adventure. In other words, the 
defendant and appellant wanted the trial court to deduct 
from the amount due from him to the plaintiffs and re-
spondents claims of third parties which he had not paid 
and was no more liable for than the other two members 
of the joint adventure. The plaintiffs and respondents 
denied that any third party claims were proper and 
insisted they were not due and owing. In other words, 
a controversy existed between plaintiffs and respondents 
and defendant and appellant in respect to whether claims 
of third parties which were not taken into account by 
Mr. Dansie should be paid. It is inconceivable to see 
upon what theory the trial court could allow these claims 
of third parties, when not paid by Mr. Newman, and 
when all members of the joint adventure were responsi-
ble therefor. The court had a perfect right to refuse to 
take into consideration in allowing the account the con-
tested claim of the third parties in view of the fact that 
the members thereof were not in agreement that any 
amount was due and owing. 
NrNTH AssiGNMENT' OF ERROR 
''The findings of fact made by the court as a re-
~sult of the attempted accounting without or in 
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ex<"ess of jurisdiction, insofar as they attempted 
to respond to the original issues of partnership 
·or employee relationship between the parties and 
duty to account, were too late, were insufficient 
and unresponsive to mnst of the issues in that 
respect in the amended complaint and amended 
answer and counter-claiin, and did not confer 
jurisdiction in accounting.'' 
It is well settled that where an accounting is necessary 
to the full determination of a controvel'Sy, a Court will 
proceed to hear it so that the whole controversy may be 
determined in one action. 
"Where a court of equity assumes jurisdiction of 
a controversy on some ground other than the 
accounting involved, it will, as a general rule, 
where an accounting is necessary to a full settle-
ment of the controversy, proceed to decree it, and 
will settle the whole controver.sy, even to the ex-
tent of adjudicating· matters of purely legal cog-
lllizance. If, however, the allegations of the bill 
creating equitable cognizance are not sustained, 
the jurisdiction will follow, and a. mere demand 
. for an account, in the absence of other or equita-
ble circumstances, will not bP enough to require 
the retention of the cause.'' 1 C. J. 616. 
TENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
"The finding of fact were unlawful because made 
in response to no pleading, and no definite issue 
defining and limiting proofs, and because the 
same were repugnant to the proofs accepted and 
heard ·by the court without any issues in account-
ing., 
We refer to the citation set forth under assignment 
nine and ·statement to answer assignment of error ten. 
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ELEVENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
''The finding·s of fact were unlawful and void be-
cause it rested almost entirely upon the void re-
port of ,Mr. Dansie acting as referee and contain-
ing only the results of unsworn hearsay state-
ments of various persons received out of the 
presence of defendant. \Vithout said hearsay 
report there was no evidence to support the find-
ings as to profits earned, items deductible, or 
balance proposed to be divided.'' 
We again repeat that Mr. Dansie as an accountant and 
bookkeeper compiled certain information from the books 
and records of the parties for the purpose of expediting 
this matter. He brought the same to the court and stated 
that he took them from the records of the defendant 
and plaintiffs. His compilation of the books was accepted 
without objection by any of the parties. He was doing 
nothing more than being of assistance to the court and 
reducing to concrete form the debits and credits of the 
various parties so that the same could be submitted to 
the court and the parties have an opportunity of con-
testing any part of the same. They elected not to do so 
and accepted the same without objection. 
TwELFTH AssiG ~MENT m•· Ennon 
''The court erred in refusing to consider evidence 
lbefore it and in rejecting other like evidence, 
showing that defendant waR injuriously debited 
in accounting with ten cents per cubic yard on 
72.676.05 cubic yards of material hauled by New-
man on the hospital job, and plaintiffs credited 
therewith, for which Newman paid and performed 
the sole consideration in the hanlage thereof.'' 
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There is a1nple evidence to support the finding of the 
court as to the number of cubic yards hauled on the 
Hospital Fill Job. Mr. Newman received 69c per ctrbic 
yard and, therefore, the parties to the joint adventure 
were entitled to the same as he received. 
THIRTEENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
"The trial court in its findings and rulings with 
respect to an asserted change order made in de-
fendant Newman's contract with the government 
on the hospital jo:b and in crediting plaintiffs with 
two-thirds of the benefit thereof in which they had 
no interest.'' 
The change order made in favor of Mr. Newman, of 
cours·e, went to the benefit of the other members of the 
joint adventure. How can a party to a joint adventure 
c-ontend that he is entitled to more than the other mem-
bers when he has admitted that they were to divide one-
third each. 
FouRTEENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
''The trial court erred in making conditional find-
ings, and in requiring the giving or filing by de-
fendant, or by either party, of ~n indetnnity bond 
as a· condition to relief from, or abatem·ent of, 
any portion thereof.'' 
We cannot understand the objection iby the .defend-
ant and appellant .as set forth in the above assignment 
of ·err.or to the judgment of the court. The conditions 
as set forth therein was for the .sole benefit of the de-
fendant and appellant. He cannot be prejudiced as a 
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stated that these plaintiffs and respondents could not 
execute on the full arnount of the judg1nent unless and 
until it had given to the defendant an indemnity bond 
in the ·Sum of $7 ,000.00, to protect it against any claims 
by third parties as set forth therein, and in addition, to 
renegotiation of contracts. This meant that a portion of 
the judgment, that is, $6,808.00, the plaintiffs and re-
spondents could not execute upon until such time as this 
bond was delivered. It simply gave the defendant and 
.appellant the rig·ht and option to require this bond if it 
.so desired; and in fairness to the plaintiffs, the defend-
ant must give to them an indemnity bond, also. The 
defendant did not have to put up a bond, and if he re-
fused to do so the plaintiffs and respondents would then 
have a right to execute upon the full amount of the 
judgment. The only parties who could have been pre-
judiced in any way were the plaintiffs and respondents. 
The court in this case had a right to make a condition, if 
it so desired, in fairness to all parties, and when the de-
fendant and appellant was not prejudiced, it certainly 
could not complain. 
FIFTEENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR 
''The final judgment was void for each of the rea-
sons hereinbefore specified with respect to the 
issues, evidence and findings, and because unsup-
ported ·by issues or evidence. Also because of its 
requirement that a ·bond or bonds be filed as a 
condition to relief from a portion thereof.'' 
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34 
This assignment is what may be termed a "catch all" 
to follow the other assignments of error set forth in 
plaintiffs' brief. He sets forth in this assignment that 
the judgment was void because of its 1·equirement that 
a bond or !bonds he filed as a condition to relief from a 
portion thereof. .Again we respectfully inform this court 
that under the terms of the judgment the only party who 
could complain would be the plaintiffs and respondents . 
.All it gave was the right and option to the defendant, if 
he so de,sired, to require a bond fron1 these plaintiffs 
and respondents to indemnify him, before they could 
execute on the whole thereof. It was nothing more than 
an option which he ·could exercise or not, as he saw fit. 
Under no conditions or circumstances could he be pre-
judiced or injured in any way. Therefore, he cannot 
complain. We are at a loss to understand why he should 
complain against a condition which was made for his 
sole benefit and use, with the option to accept it or not, 
as he saw fit. 
The court properly concluded that there was a joint 
adventure between the parties hereto inasmuch as the 
defendant and appellant, through his eounsel, admitted 
the same; that an accounting was, therefore,_ in order 
and proceeded to take the same. That the same was 
taken properly and in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah. It seems odd that the defendant 
and appellant would not at the trial of this case raisei the 
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same objections that he has now raised ,before this Ap-
pellate Court when he had ample opportunity to do so. 
The fact that this defendant and appellant swore under 
oath in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim that no 
such relationship existed; and then admitted the same, 
proves to us that he is attempting in every way to find 
some technicality to avoid payment of that which is due 
his fellow members of a joint adventure. We respectfully 
submit that the court did not err in any respect, and that 
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Loms H. CALLISTER, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
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